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 QUÉBEC/CANADA 
CHAIRE EN FISCALITÉ ET EN FI-
NANCES PUBLIQUES (CFFP) 
A. Genest-Grégoire et L. Godbout, « Ana-
lyse de l’abolition du crédit d’impôt fédé-
ral pour le transport en commun », 29 juin 
2017, 15 p. 
L'effet du crédit d'impôt pour le 
transport en commun ne justifiait  
pas son maintien. 
Mis en place en juillet 2006, le crédit d’impôt fédé-
ral pour le transport en commun sera aboli le 1er 
juillet 2017. Lors de son instauration en 2006, le 
gouvernement conservateur indiquait alors qu’il 
voulait : « […] inciter les particuliers à utiliser les 
transports en commun. Le recours accru à ces 
modes de transport allégera la congestion routière 
en milieu urbain et protégera l’environnement ». 
Depuis son adoption, les débats entourant les me-
sures fiscales ciblées ont pris énormément d’am-
pleur partout en Occident. Associé au gouverne-
ment conservateur de Stephen Harper, la mesure 
a été abolie par le gouvernement de son succes-
seur libéral Justin Trudeau. En 2017, le coût pro-
jeté de ce crédit d’impôt était estimé par le minis-
tère des Finances du Canada à 200 millions $. Le 
ministère indiquait également qu’environ 1,8 mil-
lion de Canadiens avaient bénéficié de ce crédit 
d’impôt en 2014. Le crédit a fait l’objet d’analyses 
diverses pour mesurer son coût, le nombre et les 
caractéristiques de ses bénéficiaires, mais surtout 
son efficacité à réduire les émissions de gaz à effet 
de serre par le biais d’un usage accru du transport 
en commun. 
INSTITUT C.D. HOWE 
A. Genest-Grégoire, L. Godbout et J-H. 
Guay, « The Knowledge Deficit about 
Taxes: Who it Affects and What to Do 
About it », Juillet 2017, 20 p. 
L’âge, le revenu familial et le niveau 
d’éducation sont des composantes 
déterminantes de la littératie fiscale. 
Tax professionals argue that the tax system is too 
complex for ordinary taxpayers and that this 
sometimes makes their work for clients more edu-
cational than strategic. Tax complexity is not only 
a headache for these professionals but also a 
source of inefficiency and unfairness in our tax 
system as not every citizen understands it to the 
same degree. We use the tax system to support our 
retirement, education and poverty-reduction pub-
lic programs. Failures of the tax system affect 
these programs as well. Weak understanding of 
taxes has also been shown to lower the level of 
trust of citizens in the tax system. This lower level 
of trust can translate into higher rates of tax eva-
sion or avoidance, raising the cost of taxation for 
everyone.  
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Canada has experience assessing the financial lit-
eracy of its citizens and is developing policies to 
raise it. This issue is considered strategic as finan-
cial tools and markets become more and more 
complicated and our population is aging. The tax 
system is a financial tool that citizens must know 
how to use as much as mortgages or pension funds 
are. Drawing from the research on financial liter-
acy, we aim to develop a method to measure “tax 
literacy.” We evaluate, with the use of a survey ad-
ministered by the polling firm Crop to Quebec cit-
izens, the knowledge and skills of citizens con-
cerning fiscal matters, understood broadly to in-
clude direct and indirect taxation as well as social 
transfers. Age, education and income are associ-
ated with higher knowledge of these matters, but 
not gender or being self-employed. Higher tax lit-
eracy is associated with a higher propensity for 
taxpayers to produce their tax return themselves 
rather than with the help of a professional. It also 
appears that women tend to underestimate their 
understanding of tax.  
Tax literacy, and the methods for its measure-
ment, are a new tool to assess the failures of cer-
tain policies such as the Children Fitness Tax 
Credit or the Canada Learning Bond to reach 
their target audiences. More generally, weak un-
derstanding of taxes contributes to lowered trust 
in our tax system, which underpins our social 
bonds. Assessing this issue is a first step towards 
making our tax system fairer and more efficient. 
   ÉTATS-UNIS 
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES 
G. Herrera et J. Friedman, « Unpacking 
the Trump Budget’s Tax and Spending 
Plans and Unrealistic Assumptions », 
29 juin 2017, 9 p. 
Le président Trump promet le déficit 
zéro en 2027, mais ses promesses 
tiennent sur des prévisions irréalistes. 
President Trump’s budget includes deep spending 
cuts that would create hardship for millions of 
low- and moderate-income people, alongside mas-
sive tax breaks targeted to the most well-off. Nu-
merous CBPP analyses have detailed the effects of 
these “reverse Robin Hood” proposals.1 This anal-
ysis unpacks the budget’s spending and tax pro-
posals and highlights the unrealistic assumptions 
that mask the budget’s true effects. The Admin-
istration depicts its policies as reducing deficits by 
$5.6 trillion over the decade, sufficient to balance 
the budget in 2027, with only a fraction of the sav-
ings coming from cuts to health and low-income 
programs. The budget also shows that the Presi-
dent is proposing $990 billion in revenue losses. 
But this presentation hides two important facts. 
First, for President Trump’s signature tax plan, 
the budget shows no net impact on revenues. That 
is, it simply assumes that unspecified revenue-
raising provisions would offset the more than $5 
trillion cost of his proposed tax cuts, even though 
the Administration has not proposed tax policies 
that could plausibly offset that cost. Second, the 
budget assumes that the extra economic growth 
sparked by the Administration’s policy proposals 
would reduce deficits by $2.1 trillion over the dec-
ade. This “economic feedback” bonus is based on a 
rosy assumption that economic growth will rise to 
3 percent per year by 2021, a rate that most econ-
omists find highly implausible. 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE (CBO) 
CBO, « An Update to the Budget and Eco-
nomic Outlook: 2017 to 2027 », 29 juin 
2017, 32 p. 
En 2027, le déficit des États-Unis 
pourrait atteindre 5,2 % du PIB. 
CBO projects that over the next decade, if current 
laws remained generally unchanged, budget defi-
cits would eventually follow an upward trajectory 
in relation to the nation’s economic output, and 
federal debt would rise. Economic growth is pro-
jected to remain modest, averaging slightly above 
2.0 percent through 2018 and averaging some-
what below that rate for the rest of the period 
through 2027. The budgetary and economic trends 
discussed in this report are similar to those CBO 
described in January, when the agency issued its 
previous estimates. 
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INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY (ITEP) 
N. Buffie et C. Davis, « Trump Budget 
Uses Unrealistic Economic Forecast to 
Tee Up Tax Cuts », 29 juin 2017, 19 p. 
Les conséquences du budget Trump 
pourraient s’avérer catastrophiques  
pour l’économie américaine. 
President Donald Trump recently released a 
budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2018 that creates 
the appearance of reducing the deficit in nearly 
every year over the next decade and of achieving 
a balanced budget by 2027. In a move that shocked 
many observers, however, the proposal showed no 
direct impact on federal revenues from most of the 
major tax policy changes that the President pro-
posed just one month earlier. Days before the ad-
ministration released its budget, Vice President 
Mike Pence stated that President Trump would 
“sign into law the most consequential tax cut in 
American history.” For his part, President Trump 
has described his tax plan as “maybe the biggest 
tax cut we’ve ever had.” While a detailed estimate 
of the plan’s revenue impact has yet to be pro-
duced, an ITEP analysis of a similar plan released 
by the Trump campaign indicated that it would 
reduce federal revenues by up to $6.4 trillion over 
a decade.  And yet the budget not only lacked an 
acknowledgement of any drain on federal reve-
nues, but in fact showed revenues increasing be-
cause of the exceptional economic growth that the 
President’s overall policy agenda would allegedly 
unleash. Many of the details surrounding this 
budget’s representation of the President’s tax plan 
defy comprehension. “Accounting trick,” “mystery 
money,” “magic math,” and “simply ludicrous” are 
just a few of the phrases uttered in the days fol-
lowing the budget’s release.6 After initially trying 
to sidestep these criticisms by claiming that the 
President had not proposed a tax cut at all, the 
administration’s budget director, Mick Mulvaney, 
ultimately made the astonishing admission that “I 
wouldn’t take what’s in the budget as indicative of 
what our [tax policy] proposals are.” But while the 
budget’s inaccurate portrayal of the President’s 
tax plan has rightly sparked controversy, an even 
more fundamental manipulation of the budget has 
taken place with equally significant implications 
for the debate over federal tax policy. Specifically, 
the economic growth forecasts contained in Presi-
dent Trump’s budget are unreliable and should 
not be taken seriously by anyone seeking to un-
derstand the nation’s true budget outlook, and the 
impact of tax changes on that outlook.  
TAX FOUNDATION 
J. Walczak, « Unpacking the State and 
Local Tax Toolkit: Sources of State and 
Local Tax Collections », 20 juin 2017, 
15 p. 
L'impôt corporatif ne représente que 
3.7 % des revenus des villes et  
États américains. 
Maine has its blueberry tax and the voluminous 
Alabama constitution specifically provides for 
mosquito taxes in Mobile County—alas, the tax is 
levied on property, not mosquitoes—but when 
state and local governments wish to raise revenue, 
they generally turn to a traditional canon of tax 
options, like property taxes, sales taxes, and indi-
vidual and corporate income taxes. The degree to 
which states lean on these options, however, and 
the extent to which they turn to alternatives, var-
ies based on demography, geography, and even 
ideology. 
 
Oregon derives over two-thirds of state tax reve-
nue from income taxes, while North Dakota raises 
less than a tenth of its revenue that way. In New 
England, only 1.4 percent of local government tax 
revenue comes from sales and gross receipts taxes, 
compared to 34.0 percent in the Southwest. In 
“live free or die” New Hampshire, 23.7 percent of 
state tax revenue is generated by corporate taxes, 
whereas such taxes are responsible for a mere 2.1 
percent of state revenue in Hawaii. 
A state with an abundance of natural resources, 
like North Dakota, might turn predominantly to 
severance taxes, while one with a high volume of 
tourists, like Florida, can see value in relying 
heavily on sales taxes. Some states, particularly 
in New England, have longstanding traditions of 
both state and local property taxes, while others, 
especially in the Southeast, make extensive use of 
general sales taxes at both levels of government. 
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   INTERNATIONAL 
FONDS MONÉTAIRE INTERNA-
TIONAL (FMI) 
C. Correa-Caro, S. Ormaechea et T. Ko-
matsuzaki, « Fiscal Reforms, Long-term 
Growth and Income Inequality », Working 
Paper No. 17/145, 29 juin 2017, 46 p.  
Les pays ayant une fiscalité favorable à 
la croissance ont effectivement connu 
une croissance plus importante. 
We estimate the effects on growth of nine fiscal 
reform episodes in seven high-income countries 
using the Synthetic Control Method. These epi-
sodes are selected using an indicator-based ap-
proach applied to the evaluation of growth-
friendly fiscal reforms during 1975-2010. We find 
that in reform countries the annual growth rate of 
real GDP was on average about 1 percentage point 
above their synthetic units 10 years after each re-
spective reform. Moreover, countries which were 
initially less developed seemed to experience a 
larger growth impact after their reforms. Results 
are broadly robust to controlling for structural re-
forms on business regulation, financial market, la-
bor market, and legal and product markets, which 
may also affect growth. Our findings also suggest 
that inequality is not affected by the growth-
friendly fiscal reforms analyzed in this paper.  
INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES 
(IFS) 
M. Brewer et J. Shaw, « How Taxes and 
Welfare Benefits Affect Work Incentives:  
Lifecycle Perspective », 7 juillet 2017, 
34 p.  
La variation de l’effet des impôts et 
prestations est plus importante sur un 
cycle de vie qu’entre les individus. 
Personal taxes and benefits affect the incentive to 
work over the lifecycle by altering income-age pro-
files, insuring against adverse shocks, and chang-
ing the returns to human capital. In this paper, 
show how a lifecycle perspective alters our impres-
sion of how the UK tax and benefit system affects 
women’s work incentives. Given that actual longi-
tudinal data conflates age effects, cohort effects 
and policy effects, and, in the UK, is not available 
covering the full lifecycle, we use simulated data 
produced by a rich, dynamic structural model of 
female labour supply and human capital that in-
corporates family formation and fertility. We find 
that individuals experience considerable variabil-
ity in work incentives across life that outweighs 
the variability across individuals. Changes in the 
presence of children and a partner, as well as the 
level of any partner’s earnings, are key to explain-
ing these patterns: work incentives vary dramati-
cally depending on family composition and the 
earnings of any partner, especially for the lower-
skilled – with women’s own earnings explaining 
less than a seventh of the variation in work incen-
tives – and most women experience a number of 
different family types during the course of their 
lives. 
ORGANISATION DE COOPÉRA-
TION ET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT 
ÉCONOMIQUES (OCDE) 
OCDE, « OECD Secretary-General Re-
port to G20 Leaders », Juillet 2017, 88 p. 
L’année 2017 est une année charnière 
vers une plus grande transparence 
fiscale. 
Fixing the international tax system to close down 
loopholes, improve transparency and make sure 
that multinational enterprises pay tax where they 
carry out their activities has been a key priority of 
the G20 since its inception. Major progress has 
been achieved, making the fight against tax avoid-
ance and tax evasion a success story of the G20, 
with the support of the OECD. With recent recog-
nition of the backlash against globalisation, and a 
stronger-than-ever need to deliver an agenda of 
inclusive growth, the work of the G20/OECD work 
on tax is one of the most important contributions 
to these challenges, and one which is having a con-
crete impact to address the concerns being raised.  
2017 is the year of implementation: implementa-
tion of the Common Reporting Standard with the 
first automatic exchanges of financial account in-
formation (AEOI) to take place in September 
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2017; and, implementation of the measures to ad-
dress base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), 
with the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on 
BEPS implementation now fully operational.  
RESOLUTION FOUNDATION 
C. D’Arcy, « The Minimum Required? Mi-
nimum Wages and the Self-employed », 
4 juillet 2017, 14 p. 
Les congés parentaux pour les 
travailleurs autonomes doivent  
être bonifiés. 
The minimum wage revolutionised the lower end 
of the UK’s labour market, protecting employees 
from exploitation. But the self-employed – now 
one in seven of the workforce – are not entitled to 
the minimum wage. With growing concerns over 
their earnings and conditions, particularly in the 
so-called gig economy, extending the minimum 
wage to some of this group has been discussed. 
While a minimum wage would not be appropriate 
for the majority of the self-employed, for those who 
take work from firms or platforms and – crucially 
– don’t have control over the price they charge, 
moves to reduce exploitatively low pay for this 
group would be both meaningful and welcome. 
Existing legislation on ‘piece work’ done by em-
ployees provides a useful template, in which firms 
offering work complete a test to ensure that a per-
son working at an average pace could be expected 
to earn at least the minimum wage while carrying 
out the task. This measure alone will not assuage 
fears about poor quality self-employment; greater 
enforcement of employment law and closing the 
gap in the tax and benefit treatment of self-em-
ployed and employees as well is vital. But ensur-
ing firms using, or helping provide, self-employed 
labour set fair rates would be a helpful step to-
wards better self-employment. 
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